Then he describes the better way:

Ronald Reagan would have done it differently. He would have told a story. It might not have been a true story, but it would have had resonance. He might have found, or created, a grieving spouse--a young investment banker whose wife had died in the World Trade Center--who enlisted immediately after the attacks ... and then gave his life, heroically, defending a school for girls in Kandahar. Reagan would have inspired tears, outrage, passion, a rush to recruiting centers across the nation.

It's hard to know what's creepier: suggesting that a president should lie to drum up support for a war, or suggesting he should do so to fight a war you're not so sure about in the first place.

What Should We Do Now? Two Views
Is it time for the U.S. military to turn Afghanistan over, or is time for our troops to stay the course?

The "stay the course" view is presented by Peter Bergen, who argues that critics of the war are all wrong about Afghan history and the Afghan public's view of foreign troops (they don't mind them much): "The objections to an increased U.S. military commitment in South Asia rest on a number of flawed assumptions."  Sending  as many as 40,000 more troops--as the White House seems to favor--is "sound policy."

The opposing view comes from Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He thinks that the hawks have twisted the argument--- as he puts it:

Hawks on Afghan policy--those who favor defeating Al-Qaeda through a full-blown counterinsurgency strategy involving up to 40,000 more U.S. troops--have divined a politically clever line of argument: Win or get out.

It's a phony choice. The hawks know there's no chance of our simply pulling out of Afghanistan. That option isn't even on the White House table, despite growing public desire to end the war. The true aim of the hawks, or all-outers, in this maneuver is to discredit the real policy alternative--the middle ground.

So he's for the "middle ground," which includes this:

Third, surge about 10,000 new combat forces on top of the 68,000 already authorized and create an additional 5,000 dedicated trainers. Such a surge should be sufficient to handle immediate troubles.

Fourth, start doing what the U.S. does well--deterrence and containment. To deter, we must maintain a small, residual capability in Afghanistan for a few years, as well as offshore air and missile capabilities to inflict harsh punishment when necessary.

So to simplify: The debate is between sending 40,000 more troops, or 10,000--with a "residual capability" in Afghanistan for "a few years." There's "no chance" for any other policy--even though public opinion is clearly against sending more troops. And we're hoping to create democracy in Afghanistan?

So what should Obama do about Afghanistan? His dilemma isn't as stark as has been posed in recent press accounts, with screamers on the right demanding slavish devotion to the military's wish list and screamers on the left demanding a withdrawal. The U.S. military has become far more ... nuanced when it comes to making requests of presidents. The negotiations about what [Gen. Stanley] McChrystal can officially request will not take place anywhere near the public eye. It is very likely that more troops will be sent--to build and train the Afghan security forces, it will be said. Obama's problems on the left will be mitigated by the fact that most Democrats have also supported this war--as opposed to Iraq's--and have little desire to reverse themselves. They don't want to hurt the President, and they don't want to be perceived as weak on defense come election time.

OK, "screamers on the left" are demanding withdrawal. That would make "the left" the majority of the public, right? Klein counsels that left opposition will have little effect, since "most Democrats have also supported this war--as opposed to Iraq's--and have little desire to reverse themselves."  It's hard to figure out why this is true, or frankly why it would matter--the general public has reversed its opinion quite dramatically, hasn't it?

Apparently that doesn't much matter;  the real issue here are the Democratic politicians, who "don't want to hurt the president, and they don't want to be perceived as weak on defense come election time." Funny, then, that the public doesn't seem to mind being seen as "weak on defense," if that's really how one would describe opposition to escalating the war in Afghanistan.

These settlers from the large settlement of Efrat are contrasted somewhat with the more militant settlers who live in the small outposts--the "legal" versus "illegal" settlements, according to the Israeli government. The two are "profoundly unlike each other," writes Burleigh, "but Palestinians revile them equally."

In fact, that's just about all Palestinians do in this article: "revile," "hate," "despise" and generally just be "unwelcoming." A single Palestinian is quoted (and one Israeli human rights group that opposes the settlements). The "Two Views of the Land" the print headline promises--online the headline is "Israeli Settlers vs. the Palestinians"--may be given equal billing, but it's far from an even match.

The piece wraps up by talking about Obama's and Netanyahu's strategies and options: "Challenging...law-abiding citizens like Sharon Katz" will be politically difficult, Burleigh observes--note that law-abiding has no qualifier here as it did in the beginning. The closing paragraph reinforces the normalcy of the Katz family: "Sitting around their kitchen table, with grandchildren's plastic toys scattered on a deck beyond sliding-glass doors, the Katz family doesn't look or sound militant. Indeed, to American ears, their version of the national narrative sounds rather familiar. " Sharon Katz is given the last word: "Israel shouldn't leave any hilltop! How did communities start out in the American West? With one log cabin. When we bought this land, it was a rocky hillside. Look what it looks like today."

Political realities and options are shaped to no small degree by public perception of situations, which is in turn shaped by media coverage. Perhaps if Native Americans had been portrayed in media accounts as sympathetic individuals instead of a generally undifferentiated mass (a mass often portrayed as unwelcoming and hateful), the political realities of the American West would have turned out differently. U.S. media accounts of the Israeli settler issue that portray the settlers as highly sympathetic and "law-abiding" individuals against a backdrop of largely invisible but clearly hateful Palestinians obscure the illegality of the settlements and contribute to the intractable political situation the Time piece wrings its hands over.