Across countless blogs and media outlets, here and abroad, thousands of people have called unequivocally--often in blunt, colorful language--for killing Somali pirates. "Kill the Pirates" was the headline of a Washington Post op-ed on April 13 by Fred Iklé, a defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. As Jonah Goldberg wrote in the Los Angeles Times, "Shoot the pirates, problem solved." The mainstream media has described today's pirates as savage enemies of humankind, with pundits even saying that if it were not for political correctness, international law and human rights, we could eliminate this scourge. In his blog, Amitai Etzioni of George Washington University blames piracy itself on "a radical interpretation of human rights," which discourages capturing and trying pirates for fear of violating their rights. He proposes instead a "007 license" with shoot-to-kill permission for commercial ships. Even before the latest incident, Robert Farley and Yoav Gortzak wrote in the December 2008 issue of Foreign Policy, "nobody likes pirates, and nobody--legal niceties aside--really minds too much if you shoot them."

Considering that "the hatred is obvious," Cardenas and Andrew Flibbert think the more important "question is why": "Why the willingness to bypass legal procedures normally extended" to even those committing "other transnational crimes that are arguably more disturbing and reprehensible, such as the trafficking of children for sexual exploitation, or drug cartels" or even "private mercenaries that fuel armed conflict and take thousands of lives?" One facet of their answer is dubbed the "Disney Effect": being that "military action is indeed a quick, dramatic and satisfying morale-booster" that "makes for good soundbites and masquerades easily as derring-do, the stuff of Hollywood"--all of which is far too subtle analysis for a U.S. press intent on forcing all African conflict into a "tribal" framework.

Frothing over the recent Somali pirate caper involving a U.S. flagged merchant ship, Davis insists that, "To end Somali piracy, disproportionate measures against the shore should be taken--for every one pirate assault, a lethal air assault should immediately follow." It's perhaps understandable that Hanson doesn’t mention what Somalia offers in the way of suitable air strike targets; underdeveloped nations like Somalia don't have any. Hanson probably doesn't understand that, because like so many hawkish military historians, he doesn't understand anything about the military. He doesn't know much about warfare theory, either. He calls for extreme (though ineffectual) military measures in response to something he admits "may not be a matter of American national security" committed not by a peer competitor or a group of global extremists but by "two-bit pirates." When a giant purposely crushes an anthill, he's not pursuing a political objective; he's feeding his perversions. That, like waterboarding someone 183 times, is not the sort of thing a global hegemon needs to be doing, Victor.

Calling things "even wackier at the other end of the nut farm," Huber further points to one issue of the Weekly Standard in which both "Barnacle Bill Kristol" and Seth Cropsey call for U.S. troops "going ashore in Africa to destroy the pirates' safe havens"--a bellicose position lamentably popular across many right-wing media.

Somalia is not so much a failed-state as a didn't-even-try one. It hasn't had a government since 1991, when warlords took over and embarked on a series of intractable clan wars that have produced one of the world's worst humanitarian crises: hundreds of thousands dead and 3 million people desperately in need of aid.

In the following paragraph, Time notes that "those who try to help too often come to grief."

Yet the record shows that the humanitarian situation in Somalia has gotten far worse in the wake of a U.S./Ethiopian military invasion in '06. According to

Foreign Policy in Focus, the U.S./Ethiopian intervention ended what had been a brief six-month period of relative peace and security under the rule of the Islamic Courts. By the end of 2007, the situation had escalated into a full-scale humanitarian crisis, and today, "Nearly half of Somalia's population is starving and the stage is set for a famine on par with the horrific hunger that ravaged the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s."

Time concludes by identifying "the emergence of Iraq-style Awakening militias made up of moderate Somalis, who have taken on al-Shabaab in street battles in recent weeks" as an an "encouraging development":

The chances are that this will grow into a full-scale conflict. Still, an Awakening would also offer Somalia's best hope of keeping its extremists in check. Perhaps only in Somalia could the prospect of more war be a sign of hope.

Actually, the use of U.S.-backed militias to fight official U.S. enemies in Somalia is not a new development. As Extra! pointed out:

In early 2006, the CIA provided big payments to brutal and widely despised warlords who formed the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism," a group that clashed with the courts and snatched up "terror suspects" to feed to the CIA, actions that managed to backfire and dramatically increase public support for the Islamic Courts; experts argue that without that U.S. involvement, the Courts wouldn't have been able to build up the public support they needed to bring Mogadishu under their control (Agence France Presse, 6/15/06; Chatham House, 4/07).

As for the prospect of war being "a sign of hope" in Somalia, that's something that Extra! observed the mainstream press was saying back in 2006 too, during the U.S./Ethiopian intervention:

-"In a country with such a troubled recent history, including famine, anarchy, isolation and war, a potentially viable government has suddenly emerged"  (New York Times, 12/29/06)

-"Somalia now has the best chance in 15 years to end anarchy and establish an effective government"(Associated Press, 1/2/07)