In a story about the Senate Finance Committee voting down two amendments that would have added a public option to the committee's healthcare bill, New York Times reporters Robert Pear and Jackie Calmes (9/29/09) write, "The votes vindicated the middle-of-the-road approach taken by the committee chairman, Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana."

The Times just had a poll that found 65 percent of respondents were in favor of a public option, with just 26 percent opposed.  To call the approach favored by the rightmost one-quarter of public opinion "middle-of-the-road"--well, maybe someone ought to take away Pear and Calmes' car keys and call them a cab.

New York Times reporter Robert Pear (4/23/09) joined the rest of the media world expressing discomfort with the idea that the Senate Democrats might adopt budget reconciliation rules, which would they would use to pass major legislation on a majority vote rather than seeking 60 votes. His lead:

With solid majorities in both houses of Congress, Democrats are tempted to use their political muscle to speed passage of health care legislation with minimal concessions to the Republican minority.

That approach may be the only way they can fulfill President Obama's campaign promises, but it carries high risks as well.

In the budget blueprint for the coming year, Democrats may resort to an obscure procedure known as reconciliation to clear the way for Senate passage of a comprehensive health bill with a 51-vote majority, rather than the 60 votes that would otherwise be needed.

"Muscle," "high risk"-- you get the picture. Until you read, many paragraphs later:

House Democrats say the Republican protests are overheated. The fast-track procedures have been used 19 times since 1980 to pass major legislation, including much of President Ronald Reagan’s domestic policy agenda in 1981, welfare overhaul in 1996 and President George W. Bush’s tax cuts in 2001 and 2003.

Well, hold on. Pear says reconciliation is "obscure" and "high risk." Then later he says it's been used 19 times in the past three decades to pass major legislation. How can both be true?

It's hard to recall corporate media worrying much over the divisive, obscure tactics used to pass the Bush tax cuts or welfare reform.

The federal government has to decide what to do in a court case concerning same-sex partner benefits. Robert Pear sees this as a problem for Barack Obama in today's New York Times ("Obama on Spot Over a Benefit to Gay Couples"), explaining:

As a presidential candidate, Mr. Obama said he would "fight hard" for the rights of gay couples. As a senator, he sponsored legislation that would have provided health benefits to same-sex partners of federal employees.

Now, Mr. Obama is in a tough spot. If he supports the personnel office on denying benefits to the San Francisco court employees, he risks agitating liberal groups that helped him win election. If he supports the judges and challenges the marriage act, he risks alienating Republicans with whom he is seeking to work on economic, healthcare and numerous other matters.

It's hard to see the logic here; if Obama goes back on his campaign promise, that's a rather serious problem. (Pear's language--that he "risks agitating liberal groups"--is a rather odd way to describe a decision to deny basic rights to a class of people.)

No, the real problem--a familiar one for the media--is that if Obama keeps his campaign promise, he might alienate conservative Republicans by taking a position they disagree with. Isn't that what opposing political parties do? In the corporate media, Democrats are expected to trim their sails in order to please Republicans. It's hard to recall a Republican president facing similar warnings from the press.